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2 Introduction 
Currency flows have always been a leading policy concern, especially 
in emerging markets. The long Japanese slump, the ensuing very low 
interest rates in Japan that have lasted 20 years, and the carry trades this 
fostered made currency flows a hot topic again, even before the global 
financial crisis increased liquidity in all developed economies and led to 
a new wave of currency flows to emerging market economies. 
Emerging market economies - and developed economies, for that 
matter - have a love-hate relationship with capital flows. On the one 
hand, in principal, capital flows can help intertemporal smoothing by 
allowing increased current consumption and investment against future 
income, which these countries welcome. On the other hand, these are 
often short-term flows - so-called hot money - which may be reversed 
at any time and pose repayment difficulties. Moreover, in practice, such 
capital flows are often pro-cyclical, rather than countercyclical, leading 
to greater volatility in consumption and investment. Further, there may 
be externalities from foreign borrowing-led exchange rate exposure and 
domestic credit growth. 
Policymakers take these issues seriously and devote considerable 
time and energy to thinking about policies related to currency flows 
and implementing them. This duty almost always falls to central 
banks, which are asked to lean against the wind and set policy tools to 
control, or at least stabilize, currency flows. Accordingly, this volume 
on currency flows leads off with two essays from central bankers on 
the experiences of Peru and Turkey with these flows and their attempts 
to manage them. The discussion then turns to current trends in capital 
flows, particularly with analyses of the Chilean, Brazilian and Chinese 
cases, and concludes with discussions of policy effectiveness, spillovers 
and coordination. 
The chapters in this volume were presented as papers in their draft 
forms at the International Economic Association roundtable, hosted 
by the Central Bank of Turkey in Izmir in 2012. There was a very lively 
debate, on both policy issues and theoretical considerations. The papers 
were revised based on feedback received, and their final forms are 
presented here. 
The narratives of the Peruvian and Turkish experiences with capital 
flows set the tone of the volume. Both countries had similar periods of 
booms and busts, fueled by capital flows, and both have seen the nature 
of these flows change over time. Importantly, capital flows that were once 
driven by government borrowing are now driven by private borrowing. 
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This post-twin deficits era poses its own problems. Peru, which had 
moved away from large budget deficits and the associated capital flows 
before Turkey did, experienced a period of large capital inflows with 
low budget deficits. The capital flows were not seen as problems because 
the policy reflex was that so long as the budget deficit was controlled, 
the economy was on a sound footing. Tellingly, it later turned out that 
large capital inflows can be reversed and cause major problems quickly, 
regardless of who the domestic borrower is. Of course, this is a lesson 
that should have been learned from the East Asia crisis: those countries 
had long had sound budgetary finance, but the region experienced a 
severe crisis nonetheless. 
Both Peru and Turkey had heterodox policy responses to capital 
flows to control the capital account. These ranged from explicit capital 
controls in the form of taxes on short-term capital inflows to deliberately 
increasing the variance of the overnight interest rate to increase the risk 
of capital flows. 
In "Peru's Recent Experience in Managing Capital Flows;' Paul Castillo 
explains the Peruvian experience and stresses the importance of jointly 
prudential monetary and fiscal policies. Fiscal discipline helped limit 
capital flows, and credible monetary policy prevented high dollarization 
and excessive exchange rate risks. Hence, ·even the sudden capital flow 
reversal associated with the global financial crisis did not lead to a crisis 
in Peru. 
Turning to the Turkish experience, in "The Turkish Approach to 
Capital Flow Volatility;' Yasin Ak~elik, Erdem Ba~~!, Ergun Ermi~oglu 
and Arif Oduncu present the Turkish response to the financial crisis-
induced capital flow reversal. The Turkish case was marked by the 
use of unconventional monetary policy tools for macroprudential 
purposes. Reserve requirements, active liquidity management tools 
and a wide interest rate corridor were employed at different times or 
in tandem. 
The Chinese experience is fundamentally different, as China has yet 
to liberalize its capital account and allow unhindered capital flows. It is 
slowly opening up its capital account and distinguishing between differ-
ent types of capital flows in placing or removing barriers to flows. 
Ming Zhang focuses on the Chinese case in "The Liberalization of 
Capital Account in China: Retrospect and Prospect:' This paper is differ-
ent from the rest of the volume in that, while all other countries are 
looking for ways to control existing capital flows, China is looking for 
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ways to open up and increase capital flows in a controlled way, without 
causing macroeconomic fluctuations. 
The question of cross-border policy spillovers appears in the work 
of Brittany Baumann and Kevin Gallagher, who study the effectiveness 
of Brazilian capital controls and their spillover to Chile. In "Navigating 
Capital Flows in Brazil and Chile;' Baumann and Gallagher show that 
Brazilian policies effectively lengthened the maturity of capital flows but 
also led to increased flows to Chile. 
Controlling capital flows requires policy coordination, be it in the 
form of coordination between policymaking institutions within a coun-
try, or coordination across countries. An important question for each 
country is who shall be responsible for capital account management. In 
many countries, this duty is shouldered by the central bank, but it is not 
clear that this is the optimal allocation of responsibility. In particular, 
if the capital flows are driven by fiscal policy, either because of budget 
deficits or due to balanced-budget expansionary policies, the central 
bank taking the responsibility for currency flows may actually make it 
easier for fiscal policymakers to pursue policies that foster an unsustain-
able volume of capital inflow, with the monetary authorities taking the 
blame from any untoward effects of the capital market interventions. 
Hence, intra-country policy coordination becomes important in think-
ing about optimal controls on capital accounts. The current regime of 
central banks taking responsibility for all cyclical policies may not be the 
best one (even more so as we have come to understand the limitations of 
monetary policies in the aftermath of the crisis). 
Refet Giirkaynak highlights this issue in "Appropriate Policy Tools 
to Manage Capital Flow Eicternalities:' Giirkaynak argues that central 
banks shouldering the duty of managing capital flows has led to them 
also shouldering the blame for the effects of these flows. This, especially 
in the Turkish case, gave the government wrong incentives to pursue 
unsustainable expansionary policies, which increased foreign borrowing 
and made the central bank's job even harder. 
Inter-country policy coordination has traditionally been studied in 
much deeper detail. In particular, policies directly targeting the capital 
account and foreign exchange interventions may help in dealing with 
currency flows but may also have spillover effects to other countries. In 
this case, international policy coordination will likely enhance welfare 
by making it less likely that such measures are not merely diverting flows 
to other countries. 
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important case in this regard is the US quantitative easing, 
has had worldwide effects. The United States is not a small open 
eccmc>my; hence studying it requires modeling a world with at least two 
large countries. In such a world, each of the actions of a large country 
(both conventional monetary actions as well as those associated with 
capital account management) has consequences for the macroeconomic 
equilibrium in other countries, and the rules governing a large country's 
responses to shocks of various sorts have implications for the conse-
quences of alternative rules adopted by other countries. Moreover, the 
spillovers from the United States to the rest of the world make the policy 
less effective in the United States, as part of the stimulus is diverted to 
other countries in the form of capital flows. 
Joseph Stiglitz tackles this issue in "Monetary Policy in a Multi-Polar 
World:' His findings imply that controls on capital flows may make mone-
tary policy more effective, that including such controls in the toolkits of 
countries enhances the possibility of a cooperative equilibrium, and that 
the equilibrium of the coordinated game is welfare superior to that of the 
uncoordinated Nash equilibrium. Hence, international monetary policy 
coordination is imperative, especially if the policy action is being taken 
by large open economies. Further, it was a mistake by the international 
community to try to proscribe capital account management tools - a 
mistake which has now been recognized by the IMF, but which trade 
negotiators, particularly from the United States, seem not to have fully 
taken on board. 
Returning to the issue of capital control spillovers, Jonathan Ostry 
presents an empirical study of capital controls and foreign exchange 
interventions in emerging markets, in "Managing Capital Flows - Capital 
Controls and Foreign Exchange Intervention:' Ostry argues that while 
these policies may have spillover effects to other countries, their use 
may still be warranted, but coordinated policy actions would perform 
better than isolated policies of individual countries, reinforcing Stiglitz's 
theoretical analyses. He also notes that the same policies may be used to 
prevent painful but necessary external adjustment, in which case they 
would not be welfare- enhancing. 
This volume, as a whole, presents the current state of the art in poli-
cymaking and academic thinking on currency flows in a non-technical, 
accessible manner. The editors hope it will spur more research in this 
critical policy area. 
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